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ARTICLE

BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHAT THE
EVOLUTION OF MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
FREE-SPEECH GUARANTEE SHOWS ABOUT
ITS INTENDED BREADTH
By: Anthony W. Kraus'
Most Maryland lawyers are vaguely aware that Maryland's Declaration of
Rights contains its own guarantee of free speech that is worded differently
from the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
What the
Declaration of Rights actually says about free speech, however, and what can
be inferred from its distinctive phrasing and legislative history, are not matters
that have received much particularized attention.2 Decisions of Maryland's
courts routinely state that Article 40 of the Declaration of Rights - the principal
source of state free-speech rights - is construed in pari materia with the First

Amendment, which, as a practical matter, has entirely eclipsed Article 40 in
safeguarding communicative rights in Maryland. 3
Article 40 contains two principal clauses and one subordinate clause, which
differ significantly from the First Amendment's terse, single-clause
prohibition against Congressional action infringing freedom of speech and
related rights.' Most other states have adopted similar, more detailed
formulations of free-speech protection than the simpler federal guarantee.'
Displayed side by side for ease of comparison, the Maryland and federal
provisions state, respectively, as follows:

1Anthony W. Kraus is a principal of the firm of Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. His
practice concentrates on litigation, principally in the area of labor and employment,
but also involves First Amendment issues both in the work place and generally.

2 See,

e.g., Nefedro v. Montgomery Cnty., 414 Md. 585, 593, 996 A.2d 850, 855 n.5

(2010) ("We need not consider Article 40 and the First Amendment separately. . .").
3 Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md.
App. 605, 623, 30 A.3d 245, 256 n. 19 (2011) (Maryland courts have traditionally
treated Article 40 as being inpari materia with the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.).
4 Compare MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5

See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, DEFENSES § 5.02[2] at 5-6 (4th ed. 2006). American Bush v. City

of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1247 (Utah 2006) (43 state constitutions with similar
provisions as of 2000); see also Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 38 (Tex. 1993)
(Phillips, C.J., concurring) (collecting state constitutional provisions in the appendix
thereto).
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Article 40
* That the liberty of the press
ought to be inviolably
preserved;
* that every citizen of the State
ought to be allowed to speak,
write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects,
* being responsible for the abuse
of that privilege.

[Vol. 47.2

First Amendment
Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or
* abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press[]
*

The traditional treatment of Article 40 as being in pa

materia with the

First Amendment does not conclusively settle the question of whether, in a
proper case, the state provision might yet be found to confer different rights

from those in the First Amendment. Many Maryland cases hedge their "in
pani materia" characterizations of Article 40 with qualifications, noting that
state and federal free-speech rights are viewed as equivalents "in general" or
"ordinarily,"o but leaving open the implicit possibility that it may not always

be so. In addition, some decisions have "emphasized that simply because a
Maryland constitutional provision is in pari
materia with a federal one
does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the

same manner as its federal counterpart. "8
To date, the only discussion in a Maryland case about whether the language
of Article 40 confers any different measure of rights than the First Amendment
appears to be in the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals' 1997 decision
in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.9 In Telnikoff in response to a certified question,
the court held that a judgment by an English court imposing liability for a
defamatory letter published in the London Daily Telegraph was not entitled to
comity and enforcement in Maryland's courts.'
The Telnikoff majority
concluded that the English judgment was contrary to Maryland public policy,

which provides substantially greater safeguards than English law for freedom
6

Both the Maryland and federal constitutions also contain similar provisions

protecting two other types of communication: "speech and debate" in the legislature
and the right to "petition government for grievances." Maryland's Declaration
Rights further seeks to foster and facilitate the communicative process and the free
exchange of ideas by exhorting the legislature in Article 43 to "encourage the
diffusion of knowledge ... [and] the promotion of literature [and] the arts." See MD.
CoNST. Decl. of Rights art. 43. See also U.S. CONST. amend.
l.
ciSee, e.g, Chase v. Town of Ocean City, 825 F. Supp. 2d 599, 613 n.14 (D. Md.
2011).
cThe
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 3 77 Md. 55, 64 (2003); Howard Cnty.
Citizensfor Open Gov't, 201 Md. App. 605, 623, 30 A.3d 245, 256 n.19.
7 Tenikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 613, 702 A.2d 230, 257 (1997).
10 Id. at 573, 702 A.2d at 236.
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of speech and protection against defamation liability." In his dissent, Judge
Chasanow attributed the broad protections against defamation in Maryland
cases as having been derived from the First Amendment, and argued that
determining whether they precluded granting comity actually involved
application of federal law, rather than posing a question of "state law"
appropriate for the certification procedure.1 2 Insofar as the majority
"somehow" concluded that there was additional state-law protection against
defamation arising independently from Article 40, Judge Chasanow
complained they had failed to parse its actual language. 3 According to him,
Article 40 and its final clause concerning 'being responsible for [] abuse'
seemed "to indicate that the Drafters of the Declaration of Rights provided for
more protection against libel or slander than the First Amendment," and
therefore less protection of speech, contrary to the majority's assumption.14
Since the majority opinion did not explicitly address either the relative scope
of the two provisions or their differences in wording, the Telnikoff decision
provided no real illumination on the issue but just some distant thunder.'"
More recently, the question of the comparative scope of Article 40 and the
First Amendment was raised peripherally in Newell v. Runnels. 1 There, the

court considered wrongful discharge claims by former employees in a state's
attorney's office, who allegedly had been terminated for exercising their freespeech rights. '7 While the plaintiffs asserted in their brief that Article 40
provided them greater free-speech protection than the First Amendment, they
did not actively pursue or explain the point; and the Court, therefore, just
repeated in a footnote, and without analysis, that the provisions were in pari
materia.

Because questions will continue to arise concerning the comparative reach
of Article 40 and the First Amendment, and because of the importance of freespeech rights generally, it is useful and timely to begin considering, more fully
than has occurred to date, whether or not they really provide equivalent rights
and protections.
I.

TEXTUAL DIFFERENCES

The starting point for analyzing the comparative scope of the two
provisions is identifying the precise differences in their language. The texts of
" Id. at 598, 702 A.2d at 248.
12 Id. at 613-14, 702 A.2d at 256-57.
13 Id. at 615, 702 A.2d at
257.
14 Id. at 614, 702 A.2d at
257.
" See generally id. at 612-15, 702 A.2d at 255-57.
16 Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 967 A.2d 729
(2009).
17 Id. at 590-91, 967 A.2d at 736.
1 See Brief of Petitioners Jonathan G. Newell and State of Maryland at 33, Newell
v. Runnels, No. 48 (Md. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2008); Newell, 407 Md. at 602, 967 A.2d
at 743 n.11.
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Article 40 and the First Amendment differ in at least eight ways. The
variations do not necessarily permit some general conclusion about which
provision is more expansive, and it is possible that each could be viewed as
broader in some respects and narrower in others. Article 40 arguably is more
expansive than the First Amendment in that it:
*

begins with a stand-alone command, provided in emphatic
terms - that the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably
preserved - whereas the First Amendment more blandly
provides that Congress shall not abridge that freedom;' 9

*

contains
a
sweeping
positive
endorsement
of
communicative rights - that every citizen ought to be
allowed to speak, write and publish - whereas the First
Amendment contains a back-handed prohibition against
Congressional interference with freedom of speech and the
press; 2 0

*

protects not simply "writing and speaking"
potentially broader act of "publishing," which
could encompass other forms of expression
pictures, music and possibly other non-verbal art
referred to in Article 43;21

*

contains a broad right to communicate "sentiments on all
subjects;"22 and

*

contains no express limited focus on a government actor, as
the First Amendment does in regulating Congress and
actions by it that infringe free speech.23

but the
arguably
including
forms, as

At the same time, Article 40 is arguably less expansive in that it:
*

states in peculiarly abstract language that liberty of the press
"ought" to be preserved without containing an unequivocal
command not to infringe as does the First Amendment; 24

19 Compare MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
(emphasis added)
20 Compare MD. CONST. Deci. of Rights art. 40, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
(emphasis added)
21 Id.
22 Id. (emphasis added)
23 Id.
24 Compare MD. CONST. Deci. of Rights art. 40, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
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appears to limit the right to speak, write and publish to
"citizens" rather than to others who might seek to
communicate within Maryland; 25 and

*

contains an express acknowledgment that communicative
freedom remains conditioned upon the speaker "being
responsible for the abuse of that privilege.26
"

*
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The number and nature of these differences suggests that at least some
variation in intent might have guided the respective formulations of Article 40
and the First Amendment. When Article 40 was drafted and enacted in its
current form, the First Amendment had been in place for seventy-six years,
and the textual divergences from it could not have arisen casually or without

forethought.27
These facial differences occur in phrases, which like many constitutional
provisions are skeletal and vague expressions of general principle that
legislative history can sometimes help to clarify. Before assessing how these
differences might affect consideration of particular free-speech issues, some
reference to that legislative history is useful to see in general terms how such
differences came about and what the historical record suggests about their
meaning. Can those textual disparities really be dismissed as insignificant, as
is assumed when finding the measures inparimateria, or do they point toward
Article 40 being either more limited in its protection as suggested in the
Telnikoff dissent or possibly conferring broader communicative
rights?
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The evolution of Article 40 was not a simple matter. The provision that
became Article 40 originated in the Declaration of Rights at the time of
colonial independence in 1776, although it then was enumerated as Article 38
and was shorter. 2 8 As originally formulated, it consisted simply of current
Article 40's first clause, stating, "That the liberty of the press ought to be
inviolably preserved." 29 According to some historians and courts that have
researched the tenor of those times, forceful language protective of the press
25
26

27

MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40, cl. 2.

Id. at cl. 3.
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Major, 132 Wis. 2d 82, 90, 390 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. Ct. App.

1986), affd in part, modified in part and rev'd in part, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d

832 (1987) ("The first amendment contains no similar provision [and w]e cannot
conclude that the framers of the [state] Constitution included this language for no
purpose at all.").
28

MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights art. 38.

29

Id.
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predictably found its way into the original states' constitutions as an outgrowth
of the practice of vigorously criticizing local English officials in the colonial
press. It was a tradition that some framers of state constitutions deemed
worthy of safeguarding and perpetuating with respect to native government
officials after independence.30
There is evidence, moreover, suggesting that Maryland's "liberty of the
press" provision was motivated not just from the long-standing desire to
prohibit any "prior restraint" of publication through the courts, but also
because of specific concern about barring post-publication sanctions for some
types of speech, such as prosecution for seditious libel, from which antiFederalists especially sought protection. 3 ' In reviewing Maryland's public
policy favoring free speech, the majority opinion in Telnikoffnotes that during
Maryland's 1788 convention to ratify the United States Constitution, a
proposal was made to add Article 38's language to the federal Bill of Rights. 3 2
While the proposal was unsuccessful,
[t]he drafting committee added an intriguing, if
enigmatic, commentary: 'In prosecutions in the federal
courts for libels, the constitutional preservation of this
great and fundamental right may prove invaluable.'
Whatever the draftsmen meant by this, it is clear that they
did not share the view that a guarantee of freedom of the
press would not affect seditious libel prosecutions. 3 3
Some distinctive limitation on the kind of speech content that could be
regulated, and on the post-publication penalty that could be imposed for it,
thus appears to have been an anticipated effect of the Declaration of Rights'
"liberty of the press" language among Maryland lawmakers at or around the
time of its enactment.
As revolutionary passions waned in ensuing decades, states began enacting
constitutional speech and press protections that were different in phrasing and
tone. 3 4 At its Constitutional Convention of 1864, Maryland enacted Article 40
with its current language, both preserving the original "liberty of the press"
clause and adding two new additional clauses: "that every citizen of the State
ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." 35 At various times, including
See, e.g., Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 20-21.
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 47072 (1983).
32 Telnikoff 347 Md. at 588, 702 A.2d at 243-44.
33 Id. (quoting Anderson, supra note 31 at 472).
34
American Bush, 140 P.3d at 1247; Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 20-21.
35 MD. CONST. of 1864, Decl. of Rights art. 40. The final clause was amended three
years later in 1867 to provide "being responsible for the abuse of that privilege."
30
31

MD. CONST. of 1867, Decl. of Rights art. 40.
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before and after Maryland added these phrases, approximately forty other
states adopted similar language.36
III.

COMPARISON WITH THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE

Pennsylvania had been the first state to create and enact virtually this same
two-clause formulation, broadly allowing "speech on any subject" while
imposing "responsib[ility] for abuse," many decades before its eventual
adoption in Maryland. 3 7 It appears that this two-clause 'qualified allowance'
formulation may originally have been derived from Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Law of England, which in somewhat similar terms

stated:
Every freeman had an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what
is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.38
Blackstone sought to avert any prior restraint of the press, which he viewed as
an abomination, but was not concerned with the scope of post-publication
sanctions, which he generally believed should be available. 39 According to
Blackstone, liberty of the press was properly advanced through immunity from
"previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published."4 0
When initially fashioning and implementing the two-clause 'any
subject/but no abuse' formulation in 1790, Pennsylvania simultaneously
excised a broad, blunt exhortation from its 1776 constitution, providing that
the "press ought not be restrained," which had been analogous to Maryland's
"inviolably preserved" clause.41 Pennsylvania retained a more cryptic and
qualified endorsement of press rights, contained in its original 1776
constitution, which referred to "the printing-press being free to any person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature and any branch of
government," and which apparently sought to assure open access to multiple
viewpoints in such press coverage. 42 To this obscure "printing press" language
See supra note 5.

36

State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or. 282, 308 (2005); Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 1921.
38 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152 (4th
37

ed. 1765-1769).
39
Id. at 152.
40

1Id.

at 151-52.
Compare PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7, and PA. CONST. 1776, Decl. of Rights
XII with MD. CONST. of 1864, Decl. of Rights art. 40.
42 Anderson, supra note 31 at 465-66.
41
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was appended an endorsement of "free communication of thoughts and
opinions [as] . . . an invaluable right" along with the two-clause 'any

subject/but no abuse' formulation apparently derived from Blackstone.43
Pennsylvania and several other states that eventually adopted this two-clause
formulation also added provisions immediately following it, which expressly
acknowledged the practice of prosecuting criminal libel and commented on
how it should be conducted:
In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating
the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity,
or where the matter published is proper for public
information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence;
and in all indictments for libels the jury shall have a right
to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of
the court, as in other cases.44
Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution also effectively fortified the new 'no abuse'
qualification with an earlier reference about the right to protect and preserve
one's reputation: "All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those of . . . possessing and protecting property and
reputation . . . ."4

Consistent with this legislative history, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
eventually construed the two-clause 'any subject/but no abuse' formulation
from 1790 as having had the limited intent of enacting a ban on prior restraints,
as Blackstone had proposed.4 6 Some other state courts have adopted similar
interpretations.4 7
In contrast, Maryland's adoption of the two-clause 'any subject/but no
abuse' formulation in 1864, seventy-four years after its initial emergence in
Pennsylvania, proceeded somewhat differently. In the creation of Article 40,
its emphatic language providing for "inviolable" preservation of liberty of the
43

See William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 89-90 (1961), cert.

denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961); Ex Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 19-20.
44

PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX,

§ 7. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 12; ARK.

CONST. art. II, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶s 5-6; ILL. CONST.

art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights

§ 11; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights §§ 8-9; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MICH. CONST.

art. I, §§ 5, 19; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. 1, §
5; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.D. CONST. art 1, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7-8. See also excerpts in appendix to Ex
Parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 38.
45 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX § 1. (emphasis added)
46 William Goldman Theaters, 405 Pa. at 87.
47 See, e.g., American Bush, 140 P.3d at 1248; State v. Jackson, 356 P.2d 495, 500
(Or. 1960); Dailey v. Superior Court, 44 P. 458, 459-60 (Cal. 1896).
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press was retained in toto in its original Revolution-era form, rather than being
excised as Pennsylvania had done with the analogously emphatic language
contained in its original constitution.4 8 Equally important, in adding the new
language about "being responsible for abuse," Article 40 remained pointedly
vague about what "responsib[ility]" was contemplated.49 Article 40 did not
include any subsequent references acknowledging libel laws or stating how
prosecution for libel should be conducted, as had been added in Pennsylvania's
Constitution and had become commonplace elsewhere."o Nor was language
included in Article 40 or elsewhere in Maryland's Declaration of Rights about
redress for damage to reputation, as was included the Pennsylvania
Constitution." While state constitutions with such provisions can be viewed
as "constitutionalizing" the law of defamation by specifically alluding to it, the
"being responsible" language in amended Article 40 appears to have been left
intentionally less specific and vague.
Moreover, during the Maryland Convention's debates in 1864, the framers
of the new two-clause formulation resisted being specific about what "abuse"
was referred to in Article 40.52 A proposed amendment stating that "freedom
of the press shall be inviolably preserved except when used for treasonable
purposes" (an unsurprising suggestion during the Civil War) was rejected.53
In speaking for the majority in support of the traditional, unqualified
"inviolable liberty of the press" language, Delegate Archibald Stirling, Jr.
stated, "This article is intended . . . to assert a general principle .... If this
broad exception is made to the rule, then the question is-who is to decide
what are treasonable purposes?"5 4 The general principle of liberty of the press
was preserved without the stated exception, and no example or description of
possible "abuse" was ever inserted.
While not an exhaustive review of the origins of Article 40, this history
provides suggestive context for determining how Article 40's provisions might
most sensibly be construed.
By retaining the broad statement of the
"inviolab[ility]" of the liberty of the press, carried forward since the
Revolutionary War, Article 40 as amended still emphasized and preserved
special concern for freedom of the press. Although its "ought to be preserved"
language sounds theoretical and oblique to modem ears, it was consistent with
the early American mindset to phrase constitutional provisions in terms of

Compare MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 38 (repealed 1977), and MD. CONST.
Decl. of Rights art. 40, with PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
49 Compare MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40 with PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
50 Id.
51 Id.
48

52 RICHARD

P.

BAYLY, THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND 387 (1864).
53

Id.

54 Id.

ss See generally MD.

CONST.

Decl. of Rights art. 40.
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general hortatory principles." Interpreting this phrasing as not detracting from
the force of Article 40's protection of a free press seems especially warranted
because of its additional, insistent "inviolably preserved" language.
Moreover, if the intent of amending Article 40 in 1864 simply had been to
adopt Blackstone's objective of reining in prior restraint of the press, it is
difficult to explain why the initial resounding "liberty of the press" provision,
that appeared to have been understood as intended to curtail post-publication
prosecution for libel, was retained as the introduction of Article 40, rather than
being discarded as occurred with the comparable language in Pennsylvania or
by being in any way qualified or moderated.1 7
Indeed, the apparent intent of this language to confer special protection for
freedom of the press was acknowledged by Judge Chasanow in his Telnikoff
dissent: "Article 40 . . . establishes a clear difference between the 'liberty of
the press,' which is inviolably preserved, and the right of every citizen to
speak, write and publish, which leaves the individual responsible for abuse of
the privilege."" This distinction was important since his dissenting opinion
depicted the libelous letter as being private in nature, and only incidentally
picked up in the press:
Although the letter was published by a newspaper as a
letter for the editor ... the libel was in the letter prepared
and dispatched by a private person. The letter was
libelous regardless of whether the newspaper chose to
reprint it. Freedom of the press is not implicated.5 9
Furthermore, later construction of Article 40 by the Court of Appeals has
implicitly interpreted not only the original "liberty of the press" language, but
also the appended two-clause 'any subject/but no abuse' formulation, as
conferring free-speech protection beyond simply enacting Blackstone's
condemnation of prior restraints. The court has construed Article 40,
consistent with the First Amendment, to prohibit imposition of postpublication penalties on speech not in any way involving the press or prior
restraint of it. Thus, for example, in Nefedro v. Montgomery County, the court
invalidated a county ordinance that imposed penalties for fortune telling. 60 It
is only the language in the second clause of Article 40, concerning "every
citizen's right to speak, write and publish," that can have this protective effect,
56 See Adam Rick, FirstAmendment, Second Fiddle: Free Speech in New

Hampshire's Constitution, 7 PIERCE L. REv. 373, 381 (2009). See also, e.g., MASS.
CONST. Decl. of Rights art. XVI, pt. 1; N.C. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. I, § 14; N.H.
CONST. art. I, § 22; PA. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. I, § 7; TENN. CONST. Decl. of
Rights art. I, § 19; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13.
5 See supra note 48.
5s Telnikoff 347 Md. at 614, 702 A.2d at 256-57.
59 Id. at 615, 702 A.2d at 257.
60 Nefedro v. Montgomery Cnty, 414 Md. 585, 996 A.2d 850 (2010).
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since liberty of the press is not involved; and the invalidated penalty was a
post-publication sanction rather than a prior restraint.6
The legislative history also suggests that the "being responsible" language
in Article 40 was not intended to reduce that Article's protection of speech, in
the press or otherwise, below the level provided by the First Amendment,
contrary to the dissent's suggestion in Telnikoff 6 2 As explained above, the
"being responsible" language at most provided an intentionally vague
acknowledgement that "writing, speaking or publishing sentiments" was not
constitutionally immune from any and all sanction, but at the same time
avoided expressly constitutionalizing any particular type of sanction.63 While
the First Amendment does not contain similar "being responsible" language as
a qualification to its protections, it has been understood from its inception to
preserve at least some sanctions for abusive speech.64 Because the "being
responsible" language in Article 40 thus appears intended to codify no more
than a similar, vague recognition of such sanctions that has always been
implicit in the First Amendment, it arguably should not be construed as
providing more restricted protection of free speech than the First Amendment.
In sum, the historical record supplies at least some indication that Article
40's "liberty of the press" language was originally desired by Maryland
lawmakers as a possible addition to the federal constitution for curbing
seditious libel prosecutions, and to that extent, may have been seen as possibly
broader than the First Amendment as contemporaneously adopted and
understood.6 1 More importantly, Maryland's later adoption of the two-clause
'any subject/but no abuse' formulation in Article 40 was done in a distinctive
manner, suggesting it was not intended simply to prohibit prior restraints, as
comparable language has been construed to do in some other state
constitutions.6 In addition, there is no indication that the "being responsible
for abuse" clause was intended to make rights conferred under Article 40 less
extensive than those now viewed as granted by the First Amendment, or to
indicate any specific constitutional limitation on such rights, unlike in some
other states. On the whole, the legislative history appears to militate in favor
of construing the terms of Article 40 as providing greater rights than the First
Amendment and, equally importantly, not to militate against such a
construction in ways suggested by the different manner in which similar
language was adopted in some other states.
61

Id. at 590-91, 996 A.2d at 853 (quoting Montgomery County Code, § 32-7

(1999)).
62 Telnikoff 347 Md. at 614, 702 A.2d at 867.
63 See supra notes 49-51.
64 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979) ("Civil and criminal
liability

for defamation was well established in the common law when the First Amendment
was adopted, and there is no indication that the Framers intended to abolish such
liability.").
65 See supra Part II, pp. 87-89.
66 See supra Part III, pp. 90-92.
67 See supra Part III, pp. 92-93.
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ACTIONS OF OTHER STATE COURTS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF BROADER PROTECTION

Construing Article 40 in this manner is further supported by judicial
decisions in other states that have interpreted similar language as providing
protections greater than those of the First Amendment. In fact, there are
several different settings in which courts in other states have concluded that
provisions similar to Article 40, in whole or in part, supply broader free-speech
protection than is accorded under the First Amendment. These cases have
considered how such language bears upon a variety of free-speech questions,
including what speech is subject to regulation or can result in liability, when
regulation properly can occur by prior restraint or otherwise, and who properly
can be enjoined from interfering with free speech." Those courts have found
the "being responsible" language of the two-clause formulation is compatible
with, and does not preclude, recognizing broader rights than are conferred by
the First Amendment.
A.

PROTECTION OF OPINION

One important way speech has been protected more expansively under state
constitutions than under the First Amendment has been in safeguarding
expression of opinion. Broad First Amendment protection for statements of
opinion had been widely presumed to exist up through the 1980s.6 9 A
complicated,
context-sensitive approach had been developed for
differentiating opinion from fact, articulated most prominently in the
concurring opinions of Judges Kenneth Starr and Robert Bork in Oilman v.
Evans.70 The approaches of those two conservative jurists were overturned for
not being conservative enough in the Supreme Court's highly controversial
decision in Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 7 ' which limited the
considerations used for determining whether a statement is factual or is entitled
to constitutional protection as opinion.72
Widespread dissatisfaction with Milkovich promptly led to various
approaches by lower courts to dilute or avert its impact and effectively to
reimport some or all of the more nuanced approach of Ollman.73 One way of
achieving this result, first utilized by the New York Court of Appeals, was to

See discussion infra Part IV, pp. 94-97.
See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
70 Id. at 971, 993.
71 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
7
2 Id. at 17-18.
73 See, e.g., Kathryn Sowle, A Matter of Opinion, Milkovich Four Years Later, 3
WMv. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 512 (1994) and cases discussed therein.
68
69
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preserve traditional constitutional protection for opinion under state law,
irrespective of federal law. 7 4 In the case of Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski,
based on language similar to the two-clause formulation in Article 40, the court
essentially reinstated, under the state's constitution, broader pre-Milkovich
tests for distinguishing opinion from fact.7 5 The court stressed that in its freespeech protections, New York "made a deliberate choice not to follow the
language of the First Amendment," preferring rather "to set forth our basic
democratic ideal of liberty of the press in strong affirmative terms." Another
key factor was that New York had served as the "cultural center for the Nation
and has a long tradition of providing a hospitable climate for the free exchange
of ideas."7 Other states have followed New York's lead.
Article 40 provides a basis for reaching the same conclusion under
Maryland law, at least with respect to opinions published in the press rather
than communicated privately. Article 40 contains not only language similar
to New York's constitution about every citizen having the right to "speak,
write and publish on all subjects," but further possesses its own highly
emphatic language, retained since the Revolutionary War, assuring
inviolability of freedom of the press. 8 In so doing, it too sets forth "a
democratic ideal of liberty of the press in strong affirmative terms," arguably
even more strongly than in New York. While Maryland may not be as
significant a cultural center as New York, its Declaration of Rights clearly
aspires for it to become one through the command that the legislature
"encourage the diffusion of knowledge" and promote "literature and the
arts." 79
Keeping channels of communication free from undue restriction
would assist in achieving that aim, further justifying constitutional protection
of opinion in Maryland.
B.

PROTECTION AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINT

Some states also have determined that the language in their state
constitutions provides broader protection against government-imposed prior
restraint on speech than the First Amendment. Applying language virtually
identical to the 'speech on all subjects' assurances of Article 40, the Arizona
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 261 (1991).
Id. at 250, 252-55.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Beattie v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 746 A.2d 717, 724-25 (R.I. 2000) (finding
protection under the Rhode Island Constitution broader than Milkovich may allow
under First Amendment); Vail v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d
279, 282 (1995) (rejecting Milkovich and applying Oilman tests under the Ohio
constitution); Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 121 (2001) (extending the
same protection for opinion to private communications outside the press).
78 Compare N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8, with MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40, cl. 1
2.
79 See MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 43.
7
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Supreme Court struck down a mandate of the state utility commission, which
ordered a telephone company temporarily to block access to an information
provider service and formulate a plan for addressing pre-subscription issues
with consumers about the service before providing access to it.8 o A similar
provision was applied by the Supreme Court of Washington to void a contempt
citation issued to a news reporter for publishing, contrary to a court's
instructions, tape-recorded conversations of a defendant being tried for
solicitation of murder." The court held that the "speak, write and publish on
all subjects" language "seems to rule out prior restraints under any
circumstances, leaving the state with only post-publication sanctions. "82
Even when the two-clause 'all subjects/but no abuse' formulation has been
interpreted conservatively just to implement Blackstone's disapproval of prior
restraints, its language has been construed to do so more expansively than the
First Amendment.83 Broad protection against prior restraints may even be
more strongly compelled under Article 40, in light of its language concerning
both the inviolability of the liberty of the press and the right of every citizen
to "speak, write and publish."84
C.

PROTECTION AGAINST INFRINGEMENT OF SPEECH BY PRIVATE PARTIES

When property owners whose premises have assumed the character of a
public forum have sought to constrain communicative rights of visitors to such
sites, some state constitutions have been found to reach such practices and
prohibit such speech restriction, even without involvement of a state actor
imposing the restraint." These decisions have relied on "speak, write and
publish" clauses like those in Article 40 and the absence of any express state
actor requirement, in contrast to the First Amendment's exclusive focus on

avoiding impairment of free speech by Congress.86 The text of Article 40
might similarly support such an extension of rights against private parties. 7

" See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 350, 358

(1989) (finding the order "in the nature of a prior restraint" and invalid under the
broader protection of the Arizona constitution).

State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 364, 374 (1984).
Id. (court emphasis). See also Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992)
(any prior restraint is presumptively unconstitutional under broader state standard).
8

82
83
84
8

William Goldman Theaters, 405 Pa. at 87-88.
MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 40, cl. 2.
See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74

(1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1981), app. dism. sub nom., Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo.
1991).
86 Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908; Schmid, 84 N.J. at 560; Bock, 819 P.2d at 60-61.
87 This conclusion has been vigorously advocated in Matthew S. Fuchs, Free
Exercise ofSpeech in ShoppingMalls: Bases that Support Independent

2017]1

D.

Beyond the First Amendment

97

GREATER PROTECTION AGAINST PROSECUTION FOR OBSCENITY

Some states also have found their state constitutional grants of free speech
are more protective against censorship or prosecution for obscenity than the
First Amendment. The Court of Appeals of New Mexico determined that its
"speak, write and publish" provision confers broader protection than the First
Amendment with respect to attempted content-based regulation of speech,
principally with respect to obscenity." The distinctive affirmative language
in that provision permitting "publish[ing of] sentiments on any subject," not
present in the First Amendment, was critical to the court in fashioning a more
limited ability to censor only when obscenity was found "intolerable" instead
of just not "acceptable" under community standards. 89
These examples of cases in which state constitutional language similar to
Article 40 has conferred broader protection than the First Amendment are not
all-inclusive.
Additional practices impairing free speech that have been
invalidated based on such state law protections include, among other things,
the assessment of punitive damages for defamation, 90 permitting regulation of
"fighting words," 9 1and rigidly relying on whether government personnel have
spoken in their roles as public employees or as private citizens for purposes of
determining whether they can be disciplined for speech activities.92
CONCLUSION
It is true that not all courts in states having such constitutional provisions
have agreed with these rulings or found such state constitutional language to
compel more speech-protective outcomes than under the First Amendment. 9
Providing a comprehensive overview of the relevant cases would require far
more discussion than is feasible in this article, but suffice it to say that the more

InterpretationofArticle 40 of the MarylandDeclarationofRights, 69 ALB. L. REV.

449 (2006).
8 City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 545 (N.M. App.), cert. denied, 114
N.M. 532 (1992).
89 Id.; see also Ciancanelli, 339 Or. at 322 (concluding that criminal prohibition of
"public shows" involving "sexual conduct" was facially invalid under state
constitutional provision protecting expression on any subject).
90 Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99 (1979).
91 City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or. App. 36, 44 (2002).
92 Matthews v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. HHDCV1
16019959S, 2013 WL 3306435,
at *31 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013).
93 See, e.g., American Bush, 140 P.3d at 1235 (finding nude dancing not subject to
greater protection); Gilbert v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 725 N.W.2d 249 (S.D.
2006) (public employees' protection for speech about "public concern" not subject to
greater protection); Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221 (1994)
(freedom of expression on private mall property not subject to greater protection.).
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common judicial response has been to apply First Amendment theory and
limitations on such issues rather than a more expansive, independent state
constitutional approach.94 There is, of course, a strong practical incentive for
judges to follow the lead of First Amendment precedent, which avoids
complicating matters with local variations.95
The point here, however, is that there are several possible ways that freespeech protection under Article 40 could be found to be broader than under the
First Amendment. This would require persuading Maryland courts to withhold
their customary threshold invocation of "in pari materia," and squarely
address the distinctive language and legislative history of Article 40.96 Its
divergences from the language of the First Amendment must mean something,
or if not, at least warrant more painstaking consideration and explanation than
has been provided so far about why such differences are inconsequential. 9 7
Only after such more fully considered review will Maryland's citizens obtain
the assurance they deserve that free speech is being protected in the Free State
to the full extent intended in its Declaration of Rights.

94 Gilbert, 725 N.W.2d at 257-58 (collecting illustrative cases and noting "[t]he

majority of states with almost identical language have interpreted their state
constitutional free speech provisions as coextensive with their federal
counterparts.").
95 See generally In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 176 n.26
(1983) (confessing that the court's earlier inpari materia reading of two laws had
the practical attractions of being "quick" and "easy," but ultimately was based on a
superficial analogy between them.).
96 See supra notes 2, 7, and 8.
97 See supra note 27.

